Numbers
Figures converted from INR at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.
ABML trades at 14x trailing earnings with a 26% ROE — optically cheap and high-quality. But both numbers are artifacts of extreme leverage. Strip away the 7x debt/equity, and the underlying business earns mid-single-digit returns on assets. The single metric most likely to rerate or derate this stock is credit loss experience on the $23.5M margin funding book: any non-zero provision changes this from a growth story to a risk story.
Current Price (₹)
Market Cap ($M)
P/E (FY26)
P/B
ROE
Revenue & Earnings Power
Revenue grew from $1.89M to $5.00M over 12 years, but the real acceleration came FY22-FY25 when margin funding scaled. FY26 shows the first sign of deceleration: revenue +3.5%, PAT -22% to $0.62M. The PAT decline is driven by interest costs rising while revenue plateaued.
OPM expanded from 13% to 51% as interest income scaled — but this is pre-interest operating margin. After the interest bill, net margin is 12.4%. The 3 percentage point NPM contraction in FY26 despite stable OPM signals rising cost of funds.
EPS grew from $0.02 to $0.15 (FY25 peak), then fell to $0.11 in FY26. No dividends have ever been paid despite consistent profitability from FY19 onward — all earnings are retained to fund balance sheet growth.
Cash Generation — Are the Earnings Real?
Operating cash flow has been negative in 8 of the last 10 years. This is NOT an earnings quality red flag — it is the structural reality of a lending business where client loans consume cash. But it means ABML cannot self-fund its growth and must continuously borrow to sustain the margin funding book.
CFO/NI is deeply negative because extending margin loans to clients is an operating activity that consumes cash. Free cash flow is meaningless for this business — the correct lens is net interest margin and credit quality, not cash conversion.
Balance Sheet Health
Debt-to-equity has stabilized around 7-8x since FY20. Interest coverage of 1.9x is thin — PBT is only 0.9x of interest expense. A 10% increase in borrowing costs would cut PBT by 17%.
Valuation — Now vs Peers
ABML at 14.1x P/E sits between the small/traditional brokers (Geojit 10.7x, SMC 12.1x) and the scaled digital players (Angel One 30.5x, 5Paisa 34.3x).
Fair Value & Scenario
Base Fair Value (₹)
Current Price (₹)
Premium to Base
The numbers confirm that ABML is a genuine growth story — revenue has compounded at 13% annually for a decade and ROE is best-in-class. What the numbers contradict is the "cheap on P/E" narrative: the 26% ROE is entirely leverage-manufactured, and cash flow is structurally negative because the business model requires perpetual borrowing. Watch next quarter: if FY27 Q1 shows credit provisions above zero or interest coverage dipping below 1.5x, the leverage-for-growth model faces its first real test.